On secure communication in sensor networks under q-composite key
  predistribution with unreliable links by Zhao, Jun
ar
X
iv
:1
91
1.
00
71
8v
1 
 [c
s.I
T]
  2
 N
ov
 20
19
1
On Secure Communication in Sensor Networks
under q-Composite Key Predistribution with
Unreliable Links
Jun Zhao, Member, IEEE
Abstract—Many applications of wireless sensor networks
(WSNs) require deploying sensors in hostile environments, where
an adversary may eavesdrop communications. To secure commu-
nications in WSNs, the q-composite key predistribution scheme
has been proposed in the literature. In this paper, we investigate
secure k-connectivity in WSNs operating under the q-composite
scheme, in consideration of the unreliability of wireless links.
Secure k-connectivity ensures that any two sensors can find a path
in between for secure communication, even when k − 1 sensors
fail. We present conditions on how to set the network parameters
such that the network has secure k-connectivity asymptotically
almost surely. The result is given in the form of a sharp zero–one
law.
Index Terms—Security, sensor networks, key predistribution,
wireless communication, link unreliability.
I. INTRODUCTION
W IRELESS sensor networks (WSNs) enable a broadrange of applications including military surveillance,
industrial monitoring, and home automation [1]. When WSNs
are deployed in hostile environments, cryptographic mecha-
nisms are needed to secure communications between sensors.
Because the network topology is often unknown before de-
ployment, the idea of key predistribution has been proposed
to protect sensor communications [2].
Since Eschenauer and Gligor [2] introduced the basic key
predistribution scheme, key predistribution schemes have been
widely studied in the literature [3]–[8]. Among many key
predistribution schemes, the q-composite scheme proposed by
Chan et al. [9] as an extension of the Eschenauer–Gligor
scheme [2] has received considerable interest [10]–[16] (the
Eschenauer–Gligor scheme is the q-composite scheme in the
special case of q = 1). The q-composite scheme works as
follows. For a WSN with n sensors, prior to deployment, each
sensor is independently assigned Kn different keys which are
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selected uniformly at random from a pool Pn of Pn distinct
keys, where Kn is referred to as the key ring size. After
deployment, any two sensors establish a secure link in between
if and only if they share at least q key(s) and the physical
link constraint between them is satisfied. Pn and Kn are
functions of n, with the natural condition 1 ≤ q ≤ Kn ≤ Pn.
Examples of physical link constraints include the reliability of
the transmission channel [16]–[19] and the requirement that
the distance between two sensors need to be close enough
for direct communication [20]–[23]. The q-composite scheme
with q ≥ 2 outperforms the Eschenauer–Gligor scheme with
q = 1 in terms of the strength against small-scale sensor
capture while trading off increased vulnerability in the face
of large-scale attacks [9].
In this paper, we investigate secure k-connectivity in WSNs
employing the q-composite key predistribution scheme with
the physical link constraint represented by the on/off channel
model comprising independent channels which are either on
or off. Secure k-connectivity ensures that any two sensors
can find a path in between for secure communication, even
when any k− 1 sensors fail and are deleted from the network
topology. The on/off channel model captures the unreliability
of wireless links due to physical barriers between sensors
or harsh environmental conditions impairing communications
[24]–[26]. Our results are given in the form of a sharp zero–
one law, meaning that the network is securely k-connected
asymptotically almost surely (a.a.s.) under certain parameter
conditions and does not have secure k-connectivity a.a.s.
if parameters are slightly changed, where an event happens
a.a.s. if its probability converges to 1 over a sequence of
sets (i.e., in this paper, as the number of sensors tends to
infinity). In the asymptotic sense, the zero–one law specifies
the critical scaling of the model parameters in terms of
secure k-connectivity. Despite being asymptotic, such a critical
scaling provides useful insights to understand secure WSNs. In
a secure WSN, to increase the probability of k-connectivity, it
is often required to enlarge the number of keys in each sensor’s
memory. However, since sensors are expected to have limited
memory, it is desirable for key distribution schemes to have
low memory requirements [2], [9], [27], [28]. Therefore, it is
important to establish a zero–one law in order to carefully
dimension the q-composite key predistribution scheme for
secure communications between sensors.
We organize the rest of the paper as follows. After Section II
describes the system model, Section III presents the results.
We survey related work in Section IV. Sections V and VI are
2devoted to proving the results. Finally, we conclude the paper
in Section VII.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
The studied WSN consists of n sensors, employs the q-
composite key predistribution scheme, and works under the
on/off channel model. We will explain that the graph repre-
senting the studied WSN is an intersection of two distinct
types of random graphs. The intertwining of random graphs
makes the analysis challenging.
We use a node set Vn = {v1, v2, . . . , vn} to represent the n
sensors (the terms sensor and node are interchangeable in this
paper). For each node vi ∈ Vn, let the set of its Kn different
keys be Si. According to the q-composite key predistribution
scheme, Si is uniformly distributed among all Kn-size subsets
of a key pool Pn of Pn keys.
The q-composite key predistribution scheme is modeled by a
uniform q-intersection graph [8] denoted byGq(n,Kn, Pn). In
such a graph defined on the node set Vn, any two distinct nodes
vi and vj have an edge in between if and only if they share at
least q key(s) (an event denoted by Γij ) . With |A| being the
cardinality of a set A, event Γij is given by
[|Si ∩ Sj | ≥ q].
Under the on/off channel model, each node-to-node channel
is independently on with probability pn and off with probabil-
ity (1 − pn), where pn is a function of n with 0 < pn ≤ 1.
Letting Lij be the event that the channel between distinct
nodes vi and vj is on, we have P [Lij ] = pn, where P[E ]
denotes the probability that an event E happens, throughout the
paper. The network topology under the on/off channel model
is given by an Erdo˝s–Re´nyi graph G(n, pn) [29] with the node
set being Vn and the edge set specified by Lij .
Finally, we use Gq(n,Kn, Pn, pn) to model the n-node
WSN operating under the q-composite scheme and the on/off
channel model. In graph Gq(n,Kn, Pn, pn) defined on the
node set Vn, there exists an edge between nodes vi and vj
(an event denoted by Eij) if and only if events Γij and Lij
both happen. We have Eij = Γij ∩ Lij . Clearly, the edge set
of Gq(n,Kn, Pn, pn) is the intersection of the edge sets of
Gq(n,Kn, Pn) and G(n, pn), and these graphs are all defined
on the vertex set Vn. Then Gq(n,Kn, Pn, pn) can be seen as
the intersection of Gq(n,Kn, Pn) and G(n, pn); i.e.,
Gq(n,Kn, Pn, pn) = Gq(n,Kn, Pn) ∩G(n, pn).
In Erdo˝s–Re´nyi graph G(n, pn), all edges are independent
of each other. However, in graph Gq(n,Kn, Pn), the edges
are not independent since the events that different pairs of
three nodes share q key(s) are not independent. A recent
work [8] demonstrates different behavior of Gq(n,Kn, Pn)
and G(n, pn) in terms of clustering coefficient.
Throughout the paper, q and k are arbitrary positive integers
and do not scale with n. We define s(Kn, Pn, q) as the
probability that two different nodes share at least q key(s)
and t(Kn, Pn, q, pn) as the probability that two distinct nodes
have a secure link in Gq(n,Kn, Pn, pn). We often write
s(Kn, Pn, q) and t(Kn, Pn, q, pn) as sn and tn respectively
for simplicity. Clearly, sn and tn are the edge probabilities
in graphs Gq(n,Kn, Pn) and Gq(n,Kn, Pn, pn), respectively.
From Eij = Lij ∩ Γij and the independence of Lij and Γij ,
we obtain
tn = P[Eij ] = P[Lij] · P[Γij ] = pn · sn. (1)
By definition, sn is determined through
sn = P[Γij ] =
Kn∑
u=q
P[|Si ∩ Sj | = u], (2)
where it holds for Pn ≥ 2Kn that
P[|Si ∩ Sj | = u] =
(
Kn
u
)(
Pn−Kn
Kn−u
)(
Pn
Kn
) , for u = 1, 2, . . . ,Kn,
(3)
which along with (1) and (2) induce that under Pn ≥ 2Kn,
tn = pn ·
Kn∑
u=q
(
Kn
u
)(
Pn−Kn
Kn−u
)(
Pn
Kn
) . (4)
III. THE RESULTS
We now present the results. The natural logarithm function
is given by ln. We use the standard asymptotic notation
o(·), ω(·), O(·),Ω(·),Θ(·),∼ in [28, Footnote 1]. These sym-
bols and all other limits are understood with n→∞.
Theorem 1 below presents a sharp zero–one law for k-
connectivity in a graph Gq(n,Kn, Pn, pn). In the secure
sensor network modeled by Gq(n,Kn, Pn, pn), k-connectivity
enables any two sensors to have secure communication either
directly or through the help of relaying nodes, even when any
k − 1 sensors are removed from the network.
Theorem 1 For a graph Gq(n,Kn, Pn, pn), with a sequence
αn defined through
tn =
lnn+ (k − 1) ln lnn+ αn
n
, (5)
where tn denoting the edge probability of Gq(n,Kn, Pn, pn) is
given by (4), then it holds under Pn = Ω(n) and
Kn
2
Pn
= o(1)
that
lim
n→∞
P
[
Gq(n,Kn, Pn, pn)
is k-connected.
]
=
{
0, if lim
n→∞
αn = −∞, (6a)
1, if lim
n→∞
αn =∞. (6b)
Theorem 1 presents a strong zero–one law for k-
connectivity in graph Gq(n,Kn, Pn, pn), where a critical
scaling of tn can be set as
lnn+(k−1) ln lnn+c
n with any constant
c. In addition, the conditions Pn = Ω(n) and
Kn
2
Pn
= o(1) in
Theorem 1 are reasonable, since it is expected [2], [4], [9],
[15] that for security purposes, the key pool size Pn is at
least on the order of the node number n, and is much larger
than the number Kn of keys on each sensor. For example, for
n between 1000 and 10000, Di Pietro et al. [14] find that a
suitable choice is to set Pn as
n lnn
32 and set Kn as lnn.
3IV. RELATED WORK
We now compare Theorem 1 in this paper with related
results [11], [16], [17], [28] in the literature. After the detailed
comparison, we discuss more related work.
Comparison with [11]. Recently, [11, Theorem 1] presents
the result on the probability of minimum degree being at least
k in Gq(n,Kn, Pn, pn). An extension to k-connectivity is also
given in [11]. Below, we first explain that the results for k-
connectivity in this paper are stronger than the k-connectivity
results in [11], and then show that the proof techniques in this
paper are more advanced than those in [11].
To ensure k-connectivity (i.e., the one-law part), we need
tn =
lnn+(k−1) ln lnn+αn
n with limn→∞ αn = ∞. Then
the requirement on the key ring size Kn (i.e., the number
of keys on each sensor) in this paper for k-connectivity
is Kn = Ω
(
n
1
2
− 1
2q (lnn)
1
2q pn
− 1
2q
)
according to Lemma
1-Property (ii) below, while the requirement on the key
ring size Kn in [11] for k-connectivity satisfies Kn =
ω
(
n1−
1
q (lnn)1+
1
q pn
− 1
q
)
according to Lemma 1-Property
(iii) below, although the k-connectivity result in [11] men-
tions Kn = Ω(n
ǫ) for a positive constant ǫ (note that
ω
(
n1−
1
q (lnn)1+
1
q pn
− 1
q
)
for q ≥ 2 satisfies Ω(nǫ) for
ǫ ≤ 1 − 1q ). Then we see that the order n1−
1
q (lnn)1+
1
q pn
− 1
q
of the minimalKn in [11] is more than the square of the order
n
1
2
− 1
2q (lnn)
1
2q pn
− 1
2q of the minimal Kn in this paper, given
n1−
1
q (lnn)1+
1
q pn
− 1
q
/(
n
1
2
− 1
2q (lnn)
1
2q pn
− 1
2q
)2
= lnn.
Lemma 1 below presents the requirement on the key ring
size Kn in this paper and [11] for k-connectivity.
Lemma 1 Under Pn = ω(1), if the sequence αn defined by
(5) satisfies either limn→∞ αn =∞ or |αn| = o(lnn), then
(i) we have Kn = Ω
(
n−
1
2q (lnn)
1
2q pn
− 1
2q · √Pn
)
;
(ii) if Pn = Ω(n) (a condition of Theorem 1 in this paper),
we have Kn = Ω
(
n
1
2
− 1
2q (lnn)
1
2q pn
− 1
2q
)
;
(iii) if KnPn = o
(
1
n lnn
)
(a condition in the discussion of [11]),
we have Kn = ω
(
n1−
1
q (lnn)1+
1
q pn
− 1
q
)
.
Proof of Lemma 1:
Proving property (i):
Given (5) (i.e., tn =
lnn+(k−1) ln lnn+αn
n ), we know from
either limn→∞ αn =∞ or |αn| = o(lnn) that tn = Ω
(
lnn
n
)
.
Note that when |αn| = o(lnn), we have the stronger result
tn = Θ
(
lnn
n
)
, but we can still write tn = Ω
(
lnn
n
)
. Then
tn = Ω
(
lnn
n
)
and tn = pnsn of (1) imply
sn = Ω
(
lnn
npn
)
. (7)
Note that the q-composite scheme enforces the natural condi-
tion 1 ≤ q ≤ Kn ≤ Pn. Recently, in [8, Lemma 6], Bloznelis
shows sn ≤
[
(Knq )
]
2
(Pnq )
, which further means
sn ≤ (Kn
q/q!)2
(Pn − q)q/q! =
1
q!
(
Kn
2
Pn − q
)q
∼ 1
q!
(
Kn
2
Pn
)q
, (8)
where the last step uses Pn = ω(1).
We use (7) and (8) to derive Kn
2
Pn
= Ω
((
lnn
npn
) 1
q
)
, which
implies
Kn =
√
Ω
((
lnn
npn
) 1
q
)
· Pn = Ω
(
n−
1
2q (lnn)
1
2q pn
− 1
2q ·
√
Pn
)
.
Proving property (ii):
We use the condition Pn = Ω(n) of property (ii) and
the result Kn = Ω
(
n−
1
2q (lnn)
1
2q pn
− 1
2q · √Pn
)
of property
(i) to obtain Kn = Ω
(
n−
1
2q (lnn)
1
2q pn
− 1
2q · √n
)
=
Ω
(
n
1
2
− 1
2q (lnn)
1
2q pn
− 1
2q
)
.
Proving property (iii):
We use the condition KnPn = o
(
1
n lnn
)
of property (iii) and the
result Kn = Ω
(
n−
1
2q (lnn)
1
2q pn
− 1
2q · √Pn
)
of property (i)
to derive Kn = Ω
(
n−
1
2q (lnn)
1
2q pn
− 1
2q ·√ω(Knn lnn)) =
√
Kn · ω
(
n
1
2
− 1
2q (lnn)
1
2
+ 1
2q pn
− 1
2q
)
, which further implies
Kn = ω
(
n1−
1
q (lnn)1+
1
q pn
− 1
q
)
.
We have explained above that the k-connectivity results
in this paper are stronger than the k-connectivity results
in [11]. We now discuss the underlying reason: the proof
techniques in this paper are better than those in [11]. Specif-
ically, the challenges for k-connectivity analysis in graph
Gq(n,Kn, Pn, pn) result from the dependencies between the
edges as well as the intertwining between different ran-
dom graphs Gq(n,Kn, Pn) and G(n, pn) in the graph in-
tersection Gq(n,Kn, Pn, pn) = Gq(n,Kn, Pn) ∩ G(n, pn).
The edge dependencies in Gq(n,Kn, Pn, pn) exist since the
events that different pairs of three nodes share q key(s) are
not independent. To address the above challenges for k-
connectivity analysis, we carefully analyze the graph structure
of Gq(n,Kn, Pn, pn) and present a direct proof. In contrast,
[11] provides an indirect proof by building the relationship
between Gq(n,Kn, Pn, pn) and another simpler random graph
where the above dependencies between the edges are canceled
out. As already discussed above, the k-connectivity results
derived from our direct proof are much stronger than those
derived from the indirect proof in [11].
Comparison with [16], [17]. As detailed in Section II, the
graph model Gq(n,Kn, Pn, pn) = Gq(n,Kn, Pn) ∩G(n, pn)
studied in this paper represents the topology of a secure
sensor network employing the q-composite key predistribution
scheme [2] under the on/off channel model. When q = 1,
graph Gq(n,Kn, Pn, pn) reduces to G1(n,Kn, Pn, pn), which
models the topology of a secure sensor network employ-
ing the Eschenauer–Gligor key predistribution scheme un-
der the on/off channel model. For graph G1(n,Kn, Pn, pn),
Yag˘an [16] presents a zero–one law for connectivity, while
Zhao et al. [17] extend the result to k-connectivity. Below
we compare [16], [17] and this paper. First, our result is
for general q, while the results of [16], [17] are only for
the case of q being 1. Second, our result eliminates Yag˘an’s
condition on the existence of limn→∞(pn lnn), and eliminates
[17]’s condition that either there exists ǫ > 0 such that
s(Kn, Pn, 1)pnn > ǫ holds for all n sufficiently large or
limn→∞[s(Kn, Pn, 1)pnn] = 0.
4Comparison with [28]. Recently, [28] studies connectivity
of secure sensor networks under the q-composite key predis-
tribution scheme, when two sensors sharing q key(s) also need
to satisfy constraints of the well-known disk model [15], [20],
[22], [23] for direct communication; i.e., two sensors have
to be within certain distance to establish a link. In addition
to the disk model, [28] also considers the combination of
the disk model and the on/off channel model. Although the
networks in [28] represent more complex graphs, the results
of [28] are just for connectivity (not for k-connectivity),
and just about one-laws (not about zero–one laws). In fact,
even if zero-laws are added, [28] presents weaker granularity
of zero–one laws compared with this paper, as explained
below. We now present the zero–one law under the disk
model in detail. In secure sensor networks employing the q-
composite scheme under the disk model where n sensors are
independently and uniformly deployed in a network field A
of unit area, two sensors have a secure link in between if and
only if (i) they share at least q keys, and (ii) they have a
distance no greater than rn. The former constraint results in a
uniform q-intersection graph Gq(n,Kn, Pn) discussed before,
whereas the latter constraint induces a random geometric
graph GRGG(n, rn,A), so the network is modeled by the
intersection Gq(n,Kn, Pn)∩GRGG(n, rn,A). If the network
field A is a unit torus so that the boundary effect [30], [31]
is ignored, the one-law in [28] and its zero-law extension
[31] present the following results: under Kn = ω(lnn),
Kn = o
(
min
{√
Pn,
Pn
n
})
, rn = o(1) and
s(Kn, Pn, q) · πrn2 ∼ c lnn
n
(9)
for a positive constant c, graph Gq(n,Kn, Pn) ∩
GRGG(n, rn,A) is disconnected a.a.s. if c < 1 and
connected a.a.s. if c > 1. Note that although the results
in [28] actually use 1q!
(
Kn
2
Pn
)q · πrn2 in (9), we replace
it by s(Kn, Pn, q) · πrn2 for better comparison given
sn ∼ 1q!
(
Kn
2
Pn
)q
. If the boundary effect of network fields is
considered; for example, if the network field A is a unit square
with the boundary effect, then the results need to replace c lnnn
in (9) by c × max{ lnn+ln[1/s(Kn,Pn,q)]n , 4 ln[1/s(Kn,Pn,q)]n }.
Hence, the results considering the boundary effect under the
disk model are complex and different from those under the
on/off channel model. Below we discuss only the case of
ignoring the boundary effect of network fields, in order to
compare the disk model with the on/off channel model.
From Theorem 1, under Pn = Ω(n) and
Kn
2
Pn
= o(1), with
αn defined through
s(Kn, Pn, q) · pn = lnn+ (k − 1) ln lnn+ αn
n
, (10)
graph Gq(n,Kn, Pn, pn) (i.e., Gq(n,Kn, Pn) ∩ G(n, pn)) is
not k-connected a.a.s. if limn→∞ αn = −∞ and k-connected
a.a.s. if limn→∞ αn =∞.
As discussed above, the connectivity results under the disk
model ignoring the boundary effect use the scaling c lnnn
for c < 1 or c > 1, whereas the scaling in this paper is
lnn+(k−1) ln lnn+αn
n for limn→∞ αn = −∞ or limn→∞ αn =
∞ (for k = 1, the scaling in this paper becomes lnn+αnn ).
The scaling
lnn+(k−1) ln lnn+αn
n in this paper (
lnn+αn
n for
k = 1) is more fine-grained than the scaling c lnnn in [28]
because a deviation of αn = ±Ω(lnn) is required to get
the zero–one law in the form of c lnnn for c < 1 or c > 1,
whereas in lnn+αnn , it suffices to have an unbounded deviation,
e.g., even αn = ± ln ln · · · lnn will do. Put differently,
when k = 1, the scaling lnn+αnn in this paper covers the
case of c = 1 in c lnnn , and shows that in this case, the
graph could be connected or disconnected a.a.s., depending
on the limit of αn. Although this paper and [28] use different
scalings, we note that graph Gq(n,Kn, Pn) ∩ G(n, pn) and
Gq(n,Kn, Pn) ∩ GRGG(n, rn,A) have similar connectivity
properties when they are matched through edge probabil-
ities so that s(Kn, Pn, q) · pn in (10) is equivalent with
s(Kn, Pn, q) · πrn2 in (9) (i.e. when pn and πrn2 are the
same).
We now explain that the results for k-connectivity under
the on/off channel model in this paper are stronger than those
under the disk model in [28]. Specifically, this paper considers
Kn = Ω
(
n
1
2
− 1
2q (lnn)
1
2q pn
− 1
2q
)
from Lemma 1-Property
(ii), while [28] requires Kn = ω
(
n1−
1
q (lnn)
1
q (πrn
2)−
1
q
)
according to Footnote 1 below1. In other words, when pn and
πrn
2 are the same, the order for minimalKn in [28] is roughly
the square of the order for minimal Kn in this paper.
In addition to the above differences, similar to [11], the
reference [28] also uses an indirect proof by building the
relationship between the studied graph and another simpler
random graph where the dependencies between the edges are
canceled out. In contrast, this paper’s proof is based on an
direct analysis of the graph structure.
Connectivity of graph Gq(n,Kn, Pn). Graph
Gq(n,Kn, Pn) models the topology of a secure sensor
network with the q-composite key predistribution under
full visibility, which means that any node pair have active
channels in between so the only requirement for a secure
link is the sharing of at least q keys. For Gq(n,Kn, Pn),
Bloznelis and Łuczak [32] have derived a zero–one law
for connectivity, while an extension to k-connectivity has
been given by Bloznelis and Rybarczyk [8], [33]. Other
properties of Gq(n,Kn, Pn) are also considered in the
literature [13]. When q = 1, G1(n,Kn, Pn) models the
topology of a secure sensor network with the Eschenauer–
Gligor key predistribution scheme under full visibility.
For G1(n,Kn, Pn), its connectivity has been investigated
extensively [14], [15], [27], [34], [35].
Connectivity of Erdo˝s–Re´nyi graph G(n, pn). Erdo˝s and
Re´nyi [29] introduce the random graph model G(n, pn) de-
fined on a node set with size n such that an edge between any
1Although the results in [28] mention Kn = ω(lnn), we show that the
required condition satisfies Kn = ω
(
n
1−
1
q (lnn)
1
q (pirn2)
−
1
q
)
. From (9),
to ensure connectivity, [28] needs s(Kn, Pn, q) · pirn2 ∼ c lnn
n
with c > 1,
which with the condition rn = o(1) implies s(Kn, Pn, q) = Ω
(
lnn
n·pirn
2
)
.
Then similar to the proof of Lemma 1-Property (i) (we just replace pn
therein by pirn
2), we derive Kn = Ω
(
n
−
1
2q (lnn)
1
2q pn
−
1
2q ·
√
Pn
)
,
which along with Kn = o
(
Pn
n
)
(a condition in [28]) implies Kn =
ω
(
n
1−
1
q (lnn)
1
q (pirn2)
−
1
q
)
.
5two nodes exists with probability pn independently of all other
edges. Graph G(n, pn) models the topology induced by a sen-
sor network under the on/off channel model (when geometric
constraints for transmissions are not considered). From [29]’s
result and our Theorem 1, Erdo˝s–Re´nyi graph G(n, p′n) and
graph Gq(n,Kn, Pn, pn) have similar connectivity properties
when they are matched through edge probabilities (i.e. when
p′n equals tn in the left hand side of (5)).
Connectivity of wireless networks under the disk model
or its variants. Many connectivity studies [15], [20]–[23] of
wireless networks use the disk model, where two nodes have
to be within certain distance for direct communication. For
the node distribution, two common models are as follows: 1)
the uniform node distribution, where nodes are uniformly and
independently deployed in a network field, and 2) the Poisson
node distribution, where nodes are distributed according to a
Poisson point process. Results under these two distributions
are often shown to be equivalent since they can be connected
via Chebyshev’s inequality, which bounds the number of nodes
in a Poisson point process; see (de)Poissonization in [36,
Proof of Theorem 1.2] and [37, Proof of Proposition 6.1].
A wireless network with n nodes is often modeled by a
random geometric graph [36], [37] GRGG(n, rn,A), where
n nodes are uniformly and independently distributed in a
network field A and two nodes have an edge in between if
and only if their distance is at most the transmission range
rn. (k-)Connectivity in GRGG(n, rn,A) has been widely
investigated in the literature [20], [36]–[40], where A may
exhibit the boundary effect and letting A be a torus eliminates
the boundary effect [30], [31]. Gupta and Kumar [20] show
that with D being a disk of unit area, graph GRGG(n, rn,D)
is a.a.s. connected if and only if the sequence αn defined
by πrn
2 = lnn+αnn satisfies limn→∞ αn = ∞. Penrose [36]
extend the result to k-connectivity for GRGG(n, rn, T ) on a
torus T . Penrose [36] also studies k-connectivity in graph
GRGG(n, rn,S) on the square S, while the exact formula of
rn to ensure k-connectivity is obtained later by Li et al. [38]
as well as by Wan and Yi [39]. To further characterize the k-
connectivity behavior, Ta et al. [40] derive the phase transition
width of k-connectivity in a d-dimensional random geometric
graph for d = 1, 2, 3.
The disk model has been generalized to represent more
generic wireless connections. One generalization called the
general connection model has received much interest [30],
[41]–[43]. In this model, two nodes separated by a distance
x are directly connected with probability f(x) for a function
f : [0,∞) → [0, 1], independent of the event that any other
pair of nodes are directly connected. Mao and Anderson [30],
[41] obtain a strong connectivity result of wireless networks
under this general connection model and under the Poisson
node distribution, where the nodes are distributed according
to a Poisson point process. Their connectivity result under
the general connection model generalizes the result under
the (traditional) disk model by Gupta and Kumar [20] for
the disk model. An early analysis of connectivity of wireless
networks under the general connection model is presented by
Ta et al. [42], where they prove the probability of connectivity
is asymptotically equivalent to the probability of having no
isolated node. By analyzing the number of isolated nodes
under the general connection model, Mao and Anderson [43]
show the differences between the dense network model, the
extended network model, and the infinite network model. For a
comprehensive discussion of connectivity in wireless networks
under the general connection model or other alternatives, we
refer interested readers to an excellent book by Mao [44].
Connectivity of wireless networks under the log-normal
connection model. Despite being very useful, the above
general connection model and its special case, the disk model,
have a major limitation: connections are assumed to be inde-
pendent in some sense; more specifically, as long as two nodes
are within certain distance, they have a link in between (or with
some probability in the general connection model), no matter
how many other communicating nodes are nearby. The above
assumption may not hold in reality due to the interference be-
tween connections. Taking into account of this, the following
log-normal connection model has been considered [45], [46].
In this model, two nodes are directly connected if the received
power at one node from the other node, whose attenuation
obeys the log-normal model, is at least a given threshold [46].
Hekmat and Van Mieghem [45] investigate connectivity under
the log-normal connection model, but their results assume that
the node isolation events are independent. Without relying on
this assumption, Yang et al. [46] provide more rigorous results
by showing a necessary condition and a sufficient condition to
ensure connectivity, where the bounds in the two parts differ
by a constant factor only.
Connectivity of wireless information-theoretic secure
networks. In addition to the use of cryptographic techniques,
security of wireless networks has also been studied from
the information-theoretic perspective, where physical layer
techniques are utilized to protect communications [47], [48].
This thread of research is orthogonal to our work.
Connectivity of wireless networks under the disk model
with unreliable links. A wireless network under the disk
model on a network area A with unreliable links can be
modeled by the intersection of a random geometric graph
GRGG(n, rn,A) and an Erdo˝s–Re´nyi graph G(n, pn). Below
we discuss studies of this graph intersection in the literature.
For graph G(n, pn) ∩GRGG(n, rn,A), Yi et al. [18] in-
vestigate the distribution for the number of isolated nodes.
Yi et al. [18], [21] also explore the impact of unreliable
nodes to the number of isolated nodes. Gupta and Ku-
mar [20] present connectivity results for random geometric
graph GRGG(n, rn,A). In the same work [20], they also
propose the Gupta–Kumar conjecture for connectivity in the
intersection of a random geometric graph and an Erdo˝s–
Re´nyi graph. Specifically, the conjecture states that under
πrn
2pn =
lnn+αn
n , graph GRGG(n, rn,D) ∩G(n, pn) on
the disk D of unit area is a.a.s. connected if and only if
limn→∞ αn = ∞. One significant attempt to answer the
Gupta–Kumar conjecture is the work by Pishro-Nik et al. [23],
where GRGG(n, rn,S) ∩G(n, pn) on a unit square S is
considered. Yet, they assume that GRGG(n, rn,S) ∩G(n, pn)
is k-connected whenever its minimum degree is at least k.
This assumption is verified by Penrose [37] recently with
a lengthy proof. In fact, the results of Penrose [37] also
6address the Gupta–Kumar conjecture. The difficulty of the
conjecture is to analyze the connection structure when two
distinct kinds of graphs intersect: even if individual graphs
are highly connected, the resulting topology after intersection
can still become disconnected. Penrose [37] obtain that the
connectivity result of GRGG(n, rn, T ) ∩G(n, pn) on a unit
torus T resembles the Gupta–Kumar conjecture, but the con-
nectivity result of GRGG(n, rn,S) ∩G(n, pn) on a unit square
S is more complex. According to Penrose [37], the underlying
reason for different connectivity results under the torus and
under the square is the impact of the boundary effect on the
asymptotics for the number of isolated nodes.
V. IDEAS FOR PROVING THEOREM 1
In this section, we explain the basic ideas to prove The-
orem 1. We first introduce an additional condition |αn| =
o(lnn), and then use the relationship between connectivity
and the absence of isolated nodes.
We first show that the extra condition |αn| = o(lnn) can be
introduced in proving Theorem 1, where |αn| is the absolute
value of αn. From (5) in Theorem 1, since αn measures the
deviation of the edge probability tn from the critical scaling
lnn+(k−1) ln lnn
n , we call the extra condition |αn| = o(lnn) as
the confined deviation. Then our goal is to show
Theorem 1 with the confined deviation =⇒ Theorem 1.
(11)
We write tn back as t(Kn, Pn, q, pn) and remember that
given Kn, Pn, q and pn, one can determine αn from (4)
and (5). To show (11), we first present Lemma 2 on graph
coupling [49].
Lemma 2 For a graph Gq(n,Kn, Pn, pn) under Pn = Ω(n)
and Kn
2
Pn
= o(1), with a sequence αn defined by (5) (i.e.,
tn =
lnn+(k−1) ln lnn+αn
n ), the following results hold:
(a) If limn→∞ αn = −∞, there exists a graph
Gq(n, K˜n, P˜n, p˜n) under P˜n = Ω(n),
K˜n
2
P˜n
=
o(1) and t(K˜n, P˜n, q, p˜n) =
lnn+(k−1) ln lnn+α˜n
n with
limn→∞ α˜n = −∞ and α˜n = −o(lnn), such that there
exists a graph coupling under which Gq(n,Kn, Pn, pn)
is a spanning subgraph of Gq(n, K˜n, P˜n, p˜n).
(b) If limn→∞ αn = ∞, there exists a graph
Gq(n, K̂n, P̂n, p̂n) under P̂n = Ω(n),
K̂n
2
P̂n
= o(1)
and t(K̂n, P̂n, q, p̂n) =
lnn+(k−1) ln lnn+α̂n
n with
limn→∞ α̂n = ∞ and α̂n = o(lnn), such that there
exists a graph coupling under which Gq(n,Kn, Pn, pn)
is a spanning supergraph of Gq(n, K̂n, P̂n, p̂n).
For any graph that is not k-connected, its spanning subgraph
is not k-connected. Also, for any k-connected graph, its span-
ning supergraph is k-connected. Given the above, Lemma 2
clearly implies (11). Hence, in proving Theorem 1, we can
always assume the confined deviation |αn| = o(lnn). In the
rest of the paper, we often write Gq(n,Kn, Pn, pn) as Gq for
notation brevity.
Given the conditions of Theorem 1 (i.e., Pn = Ω(n)
and Kn
2
Pn
= o(1)), and the extra |αn| = o(lnn) intro-
duced in Section V, we utilize Lemma 1 to have Kn =
Ω
(
n
q−1
2q (lnn)
1
2q
)
= ω(1). Then given Kn = ω(1) and
Kn
2
Pn
= o(1), we use [11, Theorem 1] to obtain
lim
n→∞
P
[
Gq has a minimum
node degree at least k.
]
=
{
0, if lim
n→∞
αn = −∞, (12a)
1, if lim
n→∞
αn =∞. (12b)
Since a necessary condition for a graph to be k-connected
is that the minimum node degree is at least k, (12a) clearly
implies the zero-law (6a) of k-connectivity. Moreover, given
(12b), the one-law (6b) of k-connectivity will be proved once
we show Lemma 3 below. Note that we can introduce |αn| =
o(lnn) from the argument in Section V.
Lemma 3 For a graph Gq(n,Kn, Pn, pn) under Pn = Ω(n)
and Kn
2
Pn
= o(1), if the sequence αn defined by (5) satisfies
limn→∞ αn =∞ and |αn| = o(lnn), then
lim
n→∞
P
[
Gq has a minimum node degree at least k,
but is not k-connected.
]
= 0.
(13)
Lemma 3 is established in Section VI. Due to space limi-
tation, we provide many details in the full version [50].
VI. ESTABLISHING LEMMA 3
For a graph, let its node connectivity be the minimum
number of nodes that need to be removed to disconnect the
remaining nodes from each other. Then a graph is k-connected
if and only if its node connectivity is at least k. A graph is not
k-connected if and only if its node connectivity is less than k.
To prove Lemma 3, we have
P
[
Gq has a minimum node degree at least k,
but is not k-connected.
]
≤
k−1∑
ℓ=0
P
[
Gq’s node connectivity equals ℓ, and
Gq’s minimum node degree is greater than ℓ
]
.
(14)
We define event Fn,ℓ as follows:
Fn,ℓ : the event that Gq’s node connectivity equals ℓ,
and Gq’s minimum node degree is greater than ℓ.
(15)
Then the summation in (14) becomes
∑k−1
ℓ=0 P [Fn,ℓ]. The
idea [17] in establishing Lemma 3 is to find an upper bound
on
∑k−1
ℓ=0 P [Fn,ℓ] and show that this bound goes to zero as
n→∞.
We begin by finding the needed upper bound. Let N
denote the collection of all non-empty subsets of the node
set {v1, . . . , vn} in graph Gq. Recalling that Si denotes the
set of Kn keys on node vi, we introduce an event En(Xn)
in the following manner:
En(Xn) =
⋃
T⊆N : |T |≥1
[|∪j∈TSj | ≤ Xn,|T |]
7where Xn = [Xn,1, Xn,2, . . . , Xn,n] is an n-dimensional
integer-valued array. We define r∗n by
r∗n := min
(⌊
Pn
Kn
⌋
,
⌊n
2
⌋)
. (16)
We set
Xn,i =

Kn, for i = 1,
max{⌊(1 + ε)Kn⌋ , ⌊λKni⌋}, for i = 2, . . . , r∗n,
⌊µPn⌋ , for i = r∗n + 1, . . . , n,
(17)
for an arbitrary constant 0 < ε < 1 and constants λ and
µ specified below. Recalling the condition Pn = Ω(n),
we let Pn ≥ σn for all n sufficiently large, where σ
is certain positive constant. We select λ and µ satisfying
0 < λ < 12 , max
(
2λσ, λ
(
e2
σ
) λ
1−2λ
)
< 1, 0 < µ < 12 and
max
(
2
(√
µ
(
e
µ
)µ)σ
,
√
µ
(
e
µ
)µ)
< 1, such that the event
En(Xn) defined above satisfies
lim
n→∞
P [En(Xn)] = 0. (18)
Given P [Fn,ℓ] ≤ P [En(Xn)] + P
[
Fn,ℓ ∩ En(Xn)
]
,
and (18), we will obtain the result limn→∞ P [Fn,ℓ] = 0
once establishing the following proposition. After showing
limn→∞ P [Fn,ℓ] = 0, since k does not scale with n, we further
derive limn→∞(
∑k−1
ℓ=0 P [Fn,ℓ]) = 0, which along with (14)
and (15) completes proving Lemma 3.
Proposition 1 For a graph Gq(n,Kn, Pn, pn) under Pn =
Ω(n) and Kn
2
Pn
= o(1), if the sequence αn defined by (5)
(i.e., tn =
lnn+(k−1) ln lnn+αn
n ) satisfies limn→∞ αn = ∞
and |αn| = o(lnn), then for ℓ = 0, 1, . . . , k − 1, we have
limn→∞ P
[
Fn,ℓ ∩ En(Xn)
]
= 0.
Proof of Proposition 1:
Recall that the node set of graph Gq is Vn =
{v1, v2, . . . , vn}, and Fn,ℓ denotes the event that graph Gq’s
node connectivity equals ℓ, and Gq’s minimum node degree
is greater than ℓ. Below we analyze the graph structure of Gq
when event Fn,ℓ happens. When graph Gq’s node connectivity
equals ℓ, we have by definition that there exists a subset U of
the node set Vn = {v1, v2, . . . , vn} nodes with |U | = ℓ such
that Gq(Vn \ U) is disconnected, where Gq(Vn \ U) denotes
the subgraph of Gq with the node set restricted to Vn \ U .
We consider n ≥ ℓ + 3 so Gq(Vn \ U) has at least three
nodes. Since Gq(Vn \ U) is disconnected, Gq(Vn \ U) has a
set of components (say m components where m ≥ 2) such
that the following a© and b© both happen: a© each component
is either self-connected or has only one node; b© different
components are disconnected from each other. Considering
that Gq(Vn \U) has m components in total for some m ≥ 2,
given |Vn \U | = n− ℓ, we pick one component with at most
⌊n−ℓ2 ⌋ nodes, and call this component S. Below we explain
that S cannot have only one node. By contradiction, if S has
only one node, supposing that this node is v∗, then v∗ does
not have neighbors in Vn \U , meaning that v∗’s neighbors in
Gq all belong to the set U . Hence, with |U | = ℓ, v∗’s degree
in Gq is at most ℓ, contradicting with the condition that Gq’s
minimum degree is greater than ℓ. Summarizing the above
analysis, whenever Fn,ℓ happens, there exist disjoint subsets
U, S of the node set Vn = {v1, v2, . . . , vn} with |U | = ℓ and
2 ≤ |S| ≤ ⌊n−ℓ2 ⌋ such that
① with Gq(S) denoting the subgraph of Gq with the node
set restricted to S, Gq(S) is connected;
② with Gq(Vn \ U) denoting the subgraph of Gq with the
node set restricted to Vn \U , S is isolated in Gq(Vn \U).
We further analyze the graph structure of Gq when event
Fn,ℓ happens. We let v# be an arbitrary node in set U
(recall |U | = ℓ). Since graph Gq’s node connectivity equals
ℓ under Fn,ℓ, deleting the ℓ − 1 nodes of U \ {v#} in
Gq will still preserve connectivity of the remaining graph
Gq((Vn\U)∪ {v#}). Since we know from ② above that there
is no edge between any node in S and any node in (Vn\U)\S,
to ensure connectivity of Gq((Vn \ U) ∪ {v#}), we have
③ for any node v# in set U , v# has at least one neighbor
in S and at least one neighbor in (Vn \ U) \ S.
Now we define Cn(S) and Dn(S,U) to represent ① and ②
above. In addition, we define Bn(S,U) as the event that any
node in set U has at least one neighbor in S; i.e., Bn(S,U)
relaxes the requirement in ③ above. Summarizing the above,
we know that Fn,ℓ is a subevent of
⋃
|U|=ℓ,
2≤|S|≤⌊n−ℓ
2
⌋
[Bn(S,U)∩
Cn(S) ∩ Dn(S,U)]. We let Nn,ℓ be the collection of the
subsets of Vn with exactly ℓ elements, and let Nr(Vn \U) be
the collection of the subsets of Vn\U with exactly r elements.
Then from the union bound, we obtain
P
[
Fn,ℓ ∩En(Xn)
]
≤
∑
U∈Nn,ℓ
⌊n−ℓ
2
⌋∑
r=2
∑
S∈Nr(Vn\U)
P
[
Bn(S,U) ∩ Cn(S) ∩Dn(S,U) ∩ En(Xn)
]
. (19)
For each r = 2, 3, . . . , ⌊n−ℓ2 ⌋, when S is {v1, . . . , vr}, and
U is {vr+1, . . . , vr+ℓ}, we let Bn(S,U), Cn(S), Dn(S,U)
be Bn,r,ℓ, Cn,r, Dn,r,ℓ. We further define An,r,ℓ :=
Bn,r,ℓ ∩Cn,r ∩Dn,r,ℓ. Then by exchangeability, we obtain
from (19) that
P
[
Fn,ℓ ∩ En(Xn)
]
≤
⌊n−ℓ
2
⌋∑
r=2
(
n
ℓ
)(
n− ℓ
r
)
P
[
An,r,ℓ ∩En(Xn)
]
, (20)
where we use |Nn,ℓ| =
(
n
ℓ
)
and |Nr(Vn \ U)| =
(
n−ℓ
r
)
. Then
the proof of Proposition 1 will be completed once we show
lim
n→∞
⌊n−ℓ
2
⌋∑
r=2
(
n
ℓ
)(
n− ℓ
r
)
P
[
An,r,ℓ ∩En(Xn)
]
= 0,
for ℓ = 0, 1, . . . , k − 1. (21)
We now analyze An,r,ℓ := Bn,r,ℓ ∩Cn,r ∩Dn,r,ℓ. For each
j = r + 1, . . . , n, we define ur,j as the set of nodes, each of
8which belongs to {v1, . . . , vr} and also has an “on” channel
with node vj . For j = r + 1, . . . r + ℓ, we define
B(j)n,r,ℓ := ∪i∈ur,jΓij , (22)
and for j = r + ℓ+ 1, . . . , n, we define
D(j)n,r,ℓ := ∩i∈ur,jΓij . (23)
Then we have
Bn,r,ℓ =
r+ℓ⋂
j=r+1
B(j)n,r,ℓ, and Dn,r,ℓ =
n⋂
j=r+ℓ+1
D(j)n,r,ℓ. (24)
Conditioning on the random variables {Si, i = 1, . . . , r}
and {1[Lij ], i, j = 1, . . . , r} (these two sets determine the
event Cn,r), the events {B(j)n,r,ℓ, j = r + 1, . . . , r + ℓ} and
{D(j)n,r,ℓ, j = r + ℓ+ 1, . . . , n} are all conditionally indepen-
dent. Then we conclude via An,r,ℓ := Bn,r,ℓ ∩Cn,r ∩Dn,r,ℓ
and (24) that
P
[
An,r,ℓ ∩En(Xn)
]
= E
[
1
[
Cn,r ∩En(Xn)
]
×
r+ℓ∏
j=r+1
P
B(j)n,r,ℓ
∣∣∣∣∣ Si, i = 1, . . . , r,1[Lij ], i = 1, . . . , r,
j = r + 1, . . . r + ℓ.

×
n∏
j=r+ℓ+1
P
D(j)n,r,ℓ
∣∣∣∣∣
Si, i = 1, . . . , r,
1[Lij ], i = 1, . . . , r,
j = r + ℓ+ 1, . . . n.

]
,
(25)
where the expectation is taken over random variables {Si, i =
1, . . . , r} and
{
1[Lij ],
i = 1, . . . , r,
j = r + 1, . . . n.
}
.
For j = r + 1, . . . , r + ℓ, from (22), it holds by the union
bound that
P
B(j)n,r,ℓ
∣∣∣∣∣ Si, i = 1, . . . , r,1[Lij ], i = 1, . . . , r,
j = r + 1, . . . r + ℓ.

≤
∑
i∈ur,j
P
[
Γij | Si
]
=
∑
i∈ur,j
sn = sn|ur,j|. (26)
With ur,j =
∑r
i=1 1[Lij ], |ur,j| follows a binomial distribu-
tion with r trials and the success probability pn in each trial.
Hence, from tn = snpn, it holds that
E [sn|ur,j|] = sn · rpn = rtn. (27)
Given {Si, i = 1, . . . , r} and {1[Lij ], i, j = 1, . . . , r},
the probability of
[|(⋃i∈ur,j Si) ∩ Sj | ≥ q] is given by
(|
⋃
i∈ur,j
Si|
q
)(Knq )
(Pnq )
. Then on the event En(Xn) in (16) which
ensures | ∪i∈ur,j Si| > Xn,|ur,j|, it follows that
P
D(j)n,r,ℓ
∣∣∣∣∣
Si, i = 1, . . . , r,
1[Lij ], i = 1, . . . , r,
j = r + ℓ+ 1, . . . n.
 ≤ 1− (X|ur,j |,nq )(Knq )(
Pn
q
) .
(28)
Below we we will prove that on the event En(Xn), it holds
for all n sufficiently large that
E
[
1−
(
X|ur,j |,n
q
)(
Kn
q
)(
Pn
q
)
]
≤ gr,n, (29)
for function gr,n defined by
gr,n :=
{
min
{
e−(1+
ε2
2
)tn , e−λ2tnr
}
, for r = 2, . . . , r∗n,
e−λ2tnr + e−µ2Kn , for r = r∗n + 1, . . . , n.
(30)
In view of (25)–(29), considering the mutual independence
among
{|ur,j|}∣∣j=r+1,...,n and 1 [Cn,r ∩En(Xn)], and us-
ing E
[
1[Cn,r ∩En(Xn)]
] ≤ P[Cn,r], we obtain
P
[
An,r ∩En(Xn)
]
≤ P[Cn,r]×min{(rtn)ℓ, 1} × gr,nn−r−ℓ. (31)
To establish (29), below we we first prove that on the event
En(Xn), it holds for all n sufficiently large that
1−
(
X|ur,j |,n
q
)(
Kn
q
)(
Pn
q
) ≤ f(|ur,j|) (32)
for f(|ur,j|) defined by
f(|ur,j|) :=
1− sn, for |ur,j| = 1,
(1− sn)max{(1+ε2), λ2|ur,j |}, for |ur,j| = 2, . . . , r∗n,
e−µ2Kn for |ur,j| = r∗n + 1, . . . , n.
(33)
We now establish (32) and use (32) to show (29). We will
use the following result given by [8, Lemma 6]:
sn ≤
[(
Kn
q
)]2(
Pn
q
) . (34)
For |ur,j| = 1, it holds that
1−
(
X|ur,j |,n
q
)(
Kn
q
)(
Pn
q
) = 1− [(Knq )]2(
Pn
q
) ≤ 1− sn. (35)
For |ur,j| = 2, . . . , r∗n, it holds that(X|ur,j |,n
q
)(
Kn
q
)(
Pn
q
) ≥ sn · (X|ur,j |,nq )(Kn
q
)
= sn ·max
{(
⌊(1+ε)Kn⌋
q
)(
Kn
q
) , (⌊λKn|ur,j |⌋q )(
Kn
q
) } .
(36)
From Lemma 1-Property (ii), we obtain Kn =
Ω
(
n
1
2
− 1
2q (lnn)
1
2q pn
− 1
2q
)
= ω(1). As proved in the full
version [50], given Kn = ω(1), for any constants ε2 and λ2
9satisfying 0 < ε2 < (1+ε)
q−1 and 0 < λ2 < λq <
(
1
2
)q
< 1,
we have for all n sufficiently large that
max
{(
⌊(1+ε)Kn⌋
q
)(
Kn
q
) , (⌊λKn|ur,j|⌋q )(
Kn
q
) }
≥ max{(1 + ε2), λ2|ur,j|}. (37)
From 0 ≤ sn ≤ 1 and max{(1+ε2), λ2|ur,j|} > 1, we obtain
1− sn ·max{(1 + ε2), λ2|ur,j |}
≤ (1− sn)max{(1+ε2),λ2|ur,j |}. (38)
Using (37) (38) in (36), we have for |ur,j| = 2, . . . , r∗n that
1−
(
X|ur,j |,n
q
)(
Kn
q
)(
Pn
q
) ≤ (1− sn)max{(1+ε2),λ2|ur,j |}. (39)
For |ur,j| = r∗n + 1, . . . , n, it holds that
1−
(
X|ur,j |,n
q
)(
Kn
q
)(
Pn
q
) = 1− (⌊µPn⌋q )(Knq )(
Pn
q
) ≤ e−(µPnq )(Knq )(Pnq ) .
(40)
As proved by in the full version [50], for any constant µ2
satisfying 0 < µ2 < (q!)
−1µq , we obtain for all n sufficiently
large that (
⌊µPn⌋
q
)(
Kn
q
)(
Pn
q
) ≥ µ2Kn, (41)
which with (40) further implies
1−
(X|ur,j |,n
q
)(
Kn
q
)(
Pn
q
) ≤ e−µ2Kn for |ur,j| = r∗n + 1, . . . , n.
(42)
Summarizing (35) (39) and (42), on the event En(Xn), we
obtain (32) for all n sufficiently large. Now we use (32) to
show (29). From (32) and the binomial distribution of |ur,j|,
for r = 2, . . . , r∗n, it holds that
E
[
1−
(X|ur,j |,n
q
)(
Kn
q
)(
Pn
q
)
]
(43)
≤ (1− pn)r + rpn(1− pn)r−1(1 − sn)
+ [1− (1 − pn)r − rpn(1− pn)r−1](1− sn)1+ε2 . (44)
For r = 2, . . . , r∗n, based on (44) and tn = pnsn, we can
further show
(43) ≤ e−(1+ ε22 )tn . (45)
Given (32) and 0 < λ2 < 1, we obtain that 1− (
X|ur,j |,n
q
)(Knq )
(Pnq )
is upper bounded by (1 − sn)λ2|ur,j | for |ur,j | = 0, . . . , r∗n.
Then it holds for r = 2, . . . , r∗n that
(43) ≤ E
[
(1− sn)λ2|ur,j |
]
=
{
1− pn[1− (1− sn)λ2 ]
}r
.
Then we obtain for r = 2, . . . , r∗n that
(43) ≤ e−λ2tnr, (46)
by deriving
{
1− pn[1− (1− sn)λ2 ]
}r ≤ (1− pn · λ2sn)r ≤
e−λ2pnsnr = e−λ2tnr, where we use (1 − sn)λ2 ≤ 1 − λ2sn
due to 0 ≤ sn ≤ 1 and 0 < λ2 < λq <
(
1
2
)q
< 1, the fact
that 1 + x ≤ ex for any real x, and also pnsn = tn.
On the range r = r∗n + 1, . . . , n, we establish
(43) ≤ E[(1 − sn)λ2|ur,j| · 1 [|ur,j| ≤ r∗n]]
+ E
[
e−µ2Kn · 1 [|ur,j| > r∗n]
]
≤ E[(1 − sn)λ2|ur,j|]+ e−µ2Kn
≤ e−λ2tnr + e−µ2Kn , (47)
where the last step uses the result proved in (46).
The result (29) is now proved given (45) (46) and (47).
Then as explained, we obtain (31), where the term P [Cn,r] in
(31) is bounded below.
To bound P [Cn,r], we let Gq(r) be the subgraph of Gq
restricted to the vertex set {v1, . . . , vr}, and note that Cn,r
means the event of Gq(r) being connected. Let Tr denote the
collection of all spanning trees on the vertex set {v1, . . . , vr}.
We can show for any T ∈ Tr that the probability of T being
a subgraph of Gq(r) is tn
r−1, where we recall tn as the
edge probability in Gq . By Cayley’s formula [51], there are
rr−2 spanning trees on r vertices. This and the above result
P [T ⊆ Gq(r)] = tnr−1 for any T ∈ Tr, along with the union
bound and P [Cn,r] ≤ 1, together induce
P [Cn,r] ≤ min{rr−2tnr−1, 1}. (48)
Applying (48) to (31), we obtain
P
[
An,r,ℓ ∩En(Xn)
]
≤ min{rr−2tnr−1, 1} ×min{(rtn)ℓ, 1} × gr,nn−r−ℓ.
(49)
The rest of the proof is using (49) to prove (21). Due to space
limitation, we provide the details in the full version [50].
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we present a sharp zero–one law for secure
k-connectivity in a wireless sensor network under the q-
composite key predistribution scheme with unreliable links.
Secure k-connectivity ensures that any two sensors can find a
path in between for secure communication even when at most
k−1 sensors fail. The network is modeled by composing a uni-
form q-intersection graph with an Erdo˝s–Re´nyi graph, where
the former characterizes the q-composite key predistribution
scheme and the latter captures link unreliability.
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